

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69-00011R000100010023-7

Executive Registry

10023-7

67-3094/B

*Noted with interest
great interest
Suggested to OS that
ONI contacts
might be able to
help him on these points
because of these points*

17 July 1967

DCI/g

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

THROUGH: The Deputy Director

Attached is the Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Security. It has been sent to the DD/S and the DD/P for their comments by 28 August.

I think the Summary which Jack Earman prepared will be sufficient for you to read instead of the entire Survey. If you wish to look at the Recommendations, they may be found on pages 6, 11, 13, 17, 18, 21, 32, 35, 36, and 42 (see paper clips).

I have told Bob Bannerman that a personnel increase for the Office of Security is highly unlikely; hence, DD/S and the Office of Security should take positive steps to streamline procedures as much as possible. They should also look at the services performed by Security for others to ensure that they can best be done by them and at no extra cost. I personally feel that their very commendable attitude of trying to be all things to all people may be costly in manpower. Some of these things might well be done by other components for themselves without using more people.

L. K. White

25X1

Attachment

cc: Inspector General

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69-00011R000100010023-7

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT OF SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY

Summary of Findings

The Office of Security is very well managed, and its organizational structure is basically sound. The only significant flaw we found that can be traced to defective organization is the duplication of effort in the early reviews of applicant files. The combining of functions, which we recommend, would reduce the professional, clerical, and courier workload.

Certain components of the Office are understaffed and overworked. A notable example is the Personnel Security Division. The Division as a whole is badly overworked, and this is especially true of its Appraisal Section. Supervisory personnel in the Division have little time to devote to supervision. Their time is almost wholly taken up with the heavy volume of regular case work and in trouble-shooting emergencies. Eliminating duplication of effort in processing applicant files should free a few positions for assignment elsewhere in the Office, but the longer range solution, if there is one, probably lies in strict and continuous policing of functions and workloads throughout the Office.

The processing of requests for security approval for invitee travel is time-consuming, and the approvals yield little security gain. The same is true of Agency Interest Only and pre-contract clearances. We recommend modifications that would reduce the workload.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T


The most time-consuming task of the Employee Activities Branch is the reading and evaluating of employees' manuscripts proposed for publication. Exhaustive security evaluations of manuscripts that are not intelligence-related serve no useful purpose. We recommend selective evaluation. In 1963, the Employee Activities Branch answered 794 letters written to the Agency. Two years later, in 1965, the volume had increased by 1,000. The increase is accounted for, in large part, by the war in Southeast Asia, by the publicity CIA has received of late, and by the assignments of new Directors. The Executive Director-Comptroller has asked us to take a fresh look at this problem to see if the volume of replies could be reduced and if this is properly a Security function.

During 1965, the use of the polygraph by agencies of the U.S. Government came under Congressional scrutiny. A report to the President by an Inter-Agency Committee in August 1966 recommended that projects undertaken to determine the reliability and validity of the use of the polygraph as an aid to interrogation be expedited. The President has not yet taken action on the report. The Office of Security had initiated reliability and validity studies in early 1964. Although

S-E-C-R-E-T

considerable progress has been made, the pace of the polygraph research program suffers from a lack of emphasis. Only one polygraph examiner devotes full time to the program. He has only part-time clerical help and cannot keep abreast of the processing load. We recommend that the research effort be expanded.

25X1



The Agency's safety program is inadequate and will remain so until more attention is given it.

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
<p align="center">CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</p>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	Col. White				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
<p>Remarks: DDCI's handwritten note:</p> <p align="center">Noted with great interest. Suggested to OS 2 ONI contacts that might be able to help him in some of these problems.</p> <p align="center">/s/ T</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	

UNCLASSIFIED				CONFIDENTIAL				SECRET			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP											
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS						DATE		INITIALS		
1	Executive Director-Comptroller										
2											
3											
4											
5											
6											
ACTION				DIRECT REPLY				PREPARE REPLY			
APPROVAL				DISPATCH				RECOMMENDATION			
COMMENT				FILE				RETURN			
CONCURRENCE				INFORMATION				SIGNATURE			
Remarks:											
Red:											
Attached is a summary of the main points in the report of survey of the Office of Security.											
I am having a fresh look taken into the problems of [redacted] and of answering crank letters.											
JSE											
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER											
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.										DATE	
J.S.Earman, Inspector General										7/14/67	
UNCLASSIFIED				CONFIDENTIAL				SECRET			